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ssrf

Untrusted input controlling the destination of a server-side HTTP request.

Skill by jaiswalakshansh

IndexedMIT
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Works with Claude Code, Claude apps, Codex, Cursor, Gemini CLI, GitHub Copilot, VS Code, OpenCode, Goose, Windsurf. Read the repository before you give any tool access to your data.

npx agentmarket install skill/jaiswalakshansh-ssrf

Asks which of your tools to add it to (Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, VS Code, Windsurf, Gemini CLI, Claude Desktop) and shows the change first. See https://agentmart.dev/cli.

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About

Untrusted input controlling the destination of a server-side HTTP request.

Use cases: backend

No reviews yet. Installed it? Reviews come from verified installers only. How reviews work

Permissions

What this skill can do and what it asks for, from its SKILL.md. Checked Oct 25, 2026.

Tools
No tools found
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Install scripts
None found

Network hosts it talks to 1

  • codeload.github.com · found in install command

Files it touches

  • ~/.claude/skills/ssrf

What's inside

Skill name
ssrf
Description
Untrusted input controlling the destination of a server-side HTTP request.
License
MIT
Instructions
20 lines in SKILL.md · view on GitHub

Before installing

  • Instructions call the network

Files (1)

  • SKILL.md

SKILL.md (first lines)

# Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

## Recon
Find HTTP-client sinks whose URL is influenced by input: `requests.*`,
`urllib.request.urlopen`, `httpx.*`, `fetch`, `axios`. Sources: request params,
webhooks, user-supplied URLs, metadata read back from storage.

## Verify (false-positive reduction)
1. Does attacker input control the host/scheme, or only a path under a fixed host?
2. Is there an allow-list of destinations, or scheme/host validation, before the
   request? A validated allow-list neutralizes SSRF.
3. Can the request reach internal ranges (169.254.169.254, localhost, RFC1918)?
   Reachability of internal targets raises severity.

## Evidence
Source→sink path, the URL-building expression, and whether any allow-list applies.
Note that *proving* SSRF requires a running target (dynamic testing); a static
finding stays suspected.

From jaiswalakshansh/crucible, MIT.

More from jaiswalakshansh/crucible

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Last commit (this folder)
Jul 23, 2026 (3 months ago)

From GitHub (fetched Oct 24, 2026).

Details

License
MIT
First seen
Oct 24, 2026
Last checked
Oct 24, 2026

More from jaiswalakshansh

Cite this page

ssrf skill. Agent Mart. https://agentmart.dev/skills/jaiswalakshansh-ssrf (last updated 2026-10-24)