Skip to content
Agentmart
Submit a tool

insecure-deserialization

Untrusted data deserialized by an unsafe deserializer, enabling object injection / RCE.

Skill by jaiswalakshansh

IndexedMIT
Write a review

Install

Works with Claude Code, Claude apps, Codex, Cursor, Gemini CLI, GitHub Copilot, VS Code, OpenCode, Goose, Windsurf. Read the repository before you give any tool access to your data.

npx agentmarket install skill/jaiswalakshansh-insecure-deserialization

Asks which of your tools to add it to (Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, VS Code, Windsurf, Gemini CLI, Claude Desktop) and shows the change first. See https://agentmart.dev/cli.

Get the weekly diff

The weekly diff: one email a week with new agent tools, notable updates and grade changes, plus security alerts for tools you follow. Double opt-in, one-click unsubscribe.

We use your email only for this newsletter. Privacy

About

Untrusted data deserialized by an unsafe deserializer, enabling object injection / RCE.

Use cases: data

No reviews yet. Installed it? Reviews come from verified installers only. How reviews work

Permissions

What this skill can do and what it asks for, from its SKILL.md. Checked Oct 25, 2026.

Tools
No tools found
Secrets
None asked for
Install scripts
None found

Network hosts it talks to 1

  • codeload.github.com · found in install command

Files it touches

  • ~/.claude/skills/insecure-deserialization

What's inside

Skill name
insecure-deserialization
Description
Untrusted data deserialized by an unsafe deserializer, enabling object injection / RCE.
License
MIT
Instructions
20 lines in SKILL.md · view on GitHub

Files (1)

  • SKILL.md

SKILL.md (first lines)

# Insecure Deserialization

## Recon
Find unsafe deserialization sinks fed by input: `pickle.loads`, `cPickle`,
`yaml.load` (without `SafeLoader`), `marshal.loads`, `jsonpickle.decode`,
`dill.loads`, Java `ObjectInputStream`. Sources: request bodies, cookies, cache
entries, message payloads.

## Verify (false-positive reduction)
1. Is the deserializer actually unsafe? `yaml.safe_load`, `json.loads`, and
   `pickle` on trusted-only data are not this bug.
2. Is the serialized blob attacker-controlled (not signed/HMAC-verified first)?
3. Signed/verified payloads (e.g. itsdangerous) before deserialization are safe.

## Evidence
Source→sink path and the deserializer call. Note: an RCE PoC for pickle is
constructible (a `__reduce__` gadget) but Crucible does not auto-run it against a
live app; the finding stays suspected unless proven.

From jaiswalakshansh/crucible, MIT.

More from jaiswalakshansh/crucible

Signals

Stars
0
Forks
0
Open issues
0
Last commit (this folder)
Jul 23, 2026 (3 months ago)

From GitHub (fetched Oct 24, 2026).

Details

License
MIT
First seen
Oct 24, 2026
Last checked
Oct 24, 2026

More from jaiswalakshansh

Cite this page

insecure-deserialization skill. Agent Mart. https://agentmart.dev/skills/jaiswalakshansh-insecure-deserialization (last updated 2026-10-24)