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command-injection

Untrusted input reaching an OS command execution sink without safe argument handling.

Skill by jaiswalakshansh

IndexedMIT
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Works with Claude Code, Claude apps, Codex, Cursor, Gemini CLI, GitHub Copilot, VS Code, OpenCode, Goose, Windsurf. Read the repository before you give any tool access to your data.

npx agentmarket install skill/jaiswalakshansh-command-injection

Asks which of your tools to add it to (Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, VS Code, Windsurf, Gemini CLI, Claude Desktop) and shows the change first. See https://agentmart.dev/cli.

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About

Untrusted input reaching an OS command execution sink without safe argument handling.

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Permissions

What this skill can do and what it asks for, from its SKILL.md. Checked Oct 25, 2026.

Tools
No tools found
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Network hosts it talks to 1

  • codeload.github.com · found in install command

Files it touches

  • ~/.claude/skills/command-injection

What's inside

Skill name
command-injection
Description
Untrusted input reaching an OS command execution sink without safe argument handling.
License
MIT
Instructions
23 lines in SKILL.md · view on GitHub

Files (1)

  • SKILL.md

SKILL.md (first lines)

# Command Injection

## Recon
Find where external input reaches a command sink: `os.system`, `subprocess.*`
(especially `shell=True`), `os.popen`, backticks, `child_process.exec`.
Sources: request params/body/headers, CLI args, env, file contents.

## Verify (false-positive reduction)
1. Is the input actually attacker-controlled at runtime, or constant/internal?
2. Is a shell involved? `subprocess.run([...], shell=False)` with a list argument
   is generally safe — argument boundaries are preserved. `shell=True` or string
   concatenation into the command is dangerous.
3. Is the tainted value used as the command/program, or as data passed safely?
4. Any sanitizer on the path (`shlex.quote`, allow-list)?

Only forward findings where attacker input can alter the command executed.

## Evidence
Concrete source→sink path (file:line per hop), the sink expression, and a minimal
injection payload for the PoC gate (e.g. `; id`, `$(id)`). Do not claim
confirmation — that status is set only when a PoC actually fires.

From jaiswalakshansh/crucible, MIT.

More from jaiswalakshansh/crucible

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Last commit (this folder)
Jul 23, 2026 (3 months ago)

From GitHub (fetched Oct 24, 2026).

Details

License
MIT
First seen
Oct 24, 2026
Last checked
Oct 24, 2026

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Cite this page

command-injection skill. Agent Mart. https://agentmart.dev/skills/jaiswalakshansh-command-injection (last updated 2026-10-24)