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code-injection

Untrusted input reaching a dynamic code-evaluation sink (eval/exec).

Skill by jaiswalakshansh

IndexedMIT
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Works with Claude Code, Claude apps, Codex, Cursor, Gemini CLI, GitHub Copilot, VS Code, OpenCode, Goose, Windsurf. Read the repository before you give any tool access to your data.

npx agentmarket install skill/jaiswalakshansh-code-injection

Asks which of your tools to add it to (Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, VS Code, Windsurf, Gemini CLI, Claude Desktop) and shows the change first. See https://agentmart.dev/cli.

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About

Untrusted input reaching a dynamic code-evaluation sink (eval/exec).

No reviews yet. Installed it? Reviews come from verified installers only. How reviews work

Permissions

What this skill can do and what it asks for, from its SKILL.md. Checked Oct 25, 2026.

Tools
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Install scripts
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Network hosts it talks to 1

  • codeload.github.com · found in install command

Files it touches

  • ~/.claude/skills/code-injection

What's inside

Skill name
code-injection
Description
Untrusted input reaching a dynamic code-evaluation sink (eval/exec).
License
MIT
Instructions
18 lines in SKILL.md · view on GitHub

Files (1)

  • SKILL.md

SKILL.md (first lines)

# Code Injection

## Recon
Find dynamic-evaluation sinks fed by input: `eval`, `exec`, `compile`,
`Function()` (JS), template `eval`. Sources: request data, config, deserialized
values.

## Verify (false-positive reduction)
1. Is the evaluated string attacker-controlled, or a constant/whitelisted expression?
2. Is a restricted evaluator used (`ast.literal_eval`, a sandbox)? `literal_eval`
   is safe — it is not this bug.

## Evidence
Source→sink path. This class is often directly *provable*: if the tainted parameter
is a function argument, `crucible prove` calls the function with a payload and
confirms real code execution.

From jaiswalakshansh/crucible, MIT.

More from jaiswalakshansh/crucible

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Last commit (this folder)
Jul 23, 2026 (3 months ago)

From GitHub (fetched Oct 24, 2026).

Details

License
MIT
First seen
Oct 24, 2026
Last checked
Oct 24, 2026

More from jaiswalakshansh

Cite this page

code-injection skill. Agent Mart. https://agentmart.dev/skills/jaiswalakshansh-code-injection (last updated 2026-10-24)