xmtp-comms-guard

Files (28)

• .eslintrc.json
• .gitignore
• PUBLISH-CHECKLIST.md
• README.md
• SKILL.md
• enforcement.md
• package.json
• handshake.ts · src/checks/
• index.ts · src/checks/
• injectionCheck.ts · src/checks/
• peerAuth.ts · src/checks/
• piiCheck.ts · src/checks/
• rateLimit.ts · src/checks/
• trustContextCheck.ts · src/checks/
• index.ts · src/cli/
• eip191.ts · src/crypto/
• index.ts · src/
• commsGuard.ts · src/middleware/
• revocation.ts · src/
• index.ts · src/schemas/
• erc8004Cache.ts · src/security/
• hashChain.ts · src/security/
• nonceCache.ts · src/security/
• bagmanStorage.ts · src/storage/
• types.ts · src/
• basic.test.ts · test/adversarial/
• threat-model.md
• tsconfig.json

SKILL.md (first lines)

# xmtp-comms-guard — Skill Integration Guide (V6)

**Type:** Critical Security
**Version:** 6.0.0
**Required peer dependencies:** bagman, pii-guard, prompt-guard

## Mandatory Usage

All XMTP communication MUST go through the guarded client:

```ts
import { createGuardedXmtpClient } from "xmtp-comms-guard";
const { client, middleware } = await createGuardedXmtpClient(rawClient, userWallet);
```

Raw `@xmtp/client` imports are blocked by ESLint rules and SkillGuard scan.

## Three-Shift Integration

Three-Shift = EverClaw's standard approval flow with three options:
- **Approve** — allow the action
- **Redact** — downgrade/sanitize
- **Block** — deny the action

Used for: peer revocation review, key rotation re-approval, introduction chain re-evaluation.

## Enforcement Model

Enforcement is convention-based + build-time gates:
- **ESLint rule** blocks `@xmtp/client` direct imports
- **SkillGuard scan** detects raw client usage patterns
- No runtime interception of raw imports (honestly documented)

See `enforcement.md` for full details.

## Fail-Closed Conditions

The skill refuses to operate when:
- Hash chain integrity check fails on startup
- SQLCipher encryption check fails
- Nonce cache detects replay
- Unknown topic in message
- Unknown sensitivity level
- Message exceeds 64KB
- Protocol version is not "6.0"
- Peer not in registry or blocked

## Threat Model

Covered in `threat-model.md`:
- Malicious external agent → blocked by schema + checks
- Compromised internal agent → blocked by middleware + SkillGuard gates
- Host compromise → limited by Bagman + HMAC chain + fail-closed
- Replay attacks → nonce cache (90s TTL) + hash chain
- Data exfiltration → PII Guard + trust context rules

From profbernardoj/everclaw-community-branches, MIT.

More from profbernardoj/everclaw-community-branches