rust-review
Performs comprehensive Rust security review for safe/unsafe boundary issues, memory safety in unsafe blocks, concurrency hazards, panic-induced DoS, FFI…
Skill by trailofbits
Install
Works with Claude Code, Claude apps, Codex, Cursor, Gemini CLI, GitHub Copilot, VS Code, OpenCode, Goose, Windsurf. Read the repository before you give any tool access to your data.
npx agentmarket install skill/trailofbits-rust-review
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About
Use cases: security
Reviews
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What this skill can do and what it asks for, from its SKILL.md. Checked Oct 25, 2026.
- Tools
- No tools found
- Secrets
- None asked for
- Install scripts
- None found
Network hosts it talks to 1
codeload.github.com· found in install command
Files it touches
~/.claude/skills/rust-review
Tools it pre-approves 9
From allowed-tools in SKILL.md: the agent may use these without asking you each time.
AgentAskUserQuestionSendMessageTaskCreateTaskUpdateTaskListReadWriteBash
What's inside
- Skill name
rust-review- Description
- Performs comprehensive Rust security review for safe/unsafe boundary issues, memory safety in unsafe blocks, concurrency hazards, panic-induced DoS, FFI safety, and async runtime mistakes. Use when auditing Rust crates, services, or libraries — particularly those with `unsafe`, FFI, or concurrent code.
- License
- CC-BY-SA-4.0
- Allowed tools
- Agent, AskUserQuestion, SendMessage, TaskCreate, TaskUpdate, TaskList, Read, Write, Bash
- Instructions
- 402 lines in SKILL.md · view on GitHub
Before installing
- Pre-approves any shell command
Agent Skills spec issues
- files: referenced but missing: scripts/build_run_plan.py
Files (1)
- SKILL.md
SKILL.md (first lines)
# Rust Security Review
Runs in the main conversation (invoke via `/rust-review:rust-review`). Orchestrator owns the `Task*` ledger as bookkeeping for retries; workers and judges have no Task tools. Workers and judges are named plugin subagents (`rust-review:rust-review-worker`, `rust-review:rust-review-dedup-judge`, `rust-review:rust-review-fp-judge`); tool sets are declared in `plugins/rust-review/agents/*.md`. Findings are exchanged via markdown-with-YAML files in a shared output directory.
## When to Use
Rust application/library security review: safe/unsafe boundary auditing, memory safety in `unsafe` blocks, concurrency hazards, panic-induced DoS on servers, FFI safety, async-runtime mistakes.
## When NOT to Use
- Pure-C / pure-C++ codebases — use `c-review` instead.
- Smart contracts (Solana programs / NEAR contracts / Ink!) — use `solana-vulnerability-scanner` or the contract-specific skill.
- Kernel-mode Rust drivers without userspace allocator — coverage is incomplete; flag as advisory only.
- Secrets/key memory hygiene (zeroization, `Zeroize`/`ZeroizeOnDrop`/`secrecy` usage, lingering stack/heap copies) — use the `zeroize-audit` skill; rust-review does not cover memory zeroization.
## Subagents
| Subagent type | Purpose | Tool set |
|---|---|---|
| `rust-review:rust-review-worker` | Run assigned cluster, write findings | Read, Write, Edit, Bash |
| `rust-review:rust-review-dedup-judge` | Merge duplicates (runs **first**) | Read, Write, Edit, Glob |
| `rust-review:rust-review-fp-judge` | FP + severity + final reports (runs **second**) | Read, Write, Edit, Bash |
Tools come from each agent's frontmatter at spawn time. The orchestrator's `Task*`/`Agent`/`Bash`/etc. come from this skill's `allowed-tools`. **Search-tool / `Bash` interaction:** in current Claude Code, an agent granted `Bash` is **not** also granted the dedicated `Glob` **or `Grep`** tools (the calls return `No such tool available`; the harness expects `find`/`grep`/`rg` via `Bash` instead). So only the dedup-judge — the one agent that holds **no** `Bash` — uses `Glob`; the worker, fp-judge, and the orchestrator resolve and search paths with `Read` / `Bash` `find` / `rg` / `grep` / `test -f` instead. Because the cluster/finder prompt seeds are written in ripgrep regex syntax (`\s`, `\d`, `\b`), `Bash`-holding agents must run them with **`rg`**. If `rg` is not installed its call fails *loudly* (`command not found`) — fall back to `grep -E` with POSIX classes (`\s`→`[[:space:]]`, `\d`→`[[:digit:]]`, drop `\b`), never a raw-`\s` `grep` whose *silent* empty becomes a bad `cleared`. Do **not** reintroduce `Glob`/`Grep` into a `Bash`-holding agent's protocol.
---
## Architecture
```
coordinator: write context.md → build_run_plan.py → TaskCreate × M
→ spawn primer (foreground) → spawn M workers (parallel)
→ classify Phase-7 outcomes + write findings-index.txt
→ dedup-judge → fp-judge → report safety net (SARIF + REPORT.md) → return REPORT.md
```
Output directory contains: `context.md`, `plan.json`, `worker-prompts/`, `findings/`, `findings-index.d/` (per-worker shards), `findings-index.txt`, `coverage/` (per-worker coverage-gate files), `run-summary.md`, `dedup-summary.md`, `fp-summary.md`, `REPORT.md`, `REPORT.sarif`.
**Path convention:** every later phase shells out to `${RUST_REVIEW_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/*.py`, so resolve that variable first to the plugin directory that contains `prompts/clusters/unsafe-boundary.md` (and `scripts/build_run_plan.py`). Try in order, first hit wins:
1. **Native Claude Code** — `${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}`, accepted if `Bash: ls "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/prompts/clusters/unsafe-boundary.md"` resolves.
2. **Codex** — `${CODEX_PLUGIN_ROOT}` (set it the same way if that var is present and resolves the marker).
3. **Fallback search** — covers Codex installs under `~/.codex`, Claude installs under `~/.claude`, and a local checkout / repo run: `Bash: find ~/.claude ~/.codex . -path '*/plugins/rust-review/prompts/clusters/unsafe-boundary.md' -print -quit 2>/dev/null`. Take the match and strip the trailing `/prompts/clusters/unsafe-boundary.md` to get the root (the home dirs are searched before `.` so an installed copy wins over any vendored copy in the audited repo).
Set `RUST_REVIEW_PLUGIN_ROOT` to the resolved root. If all three fail, **abort** with a message naming the roots searched — do not enter Phase 4 with an empty variable (every `uv run --no-project "${RUST_REVIEW_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/..."` call would fail with a confusing path error).
**Scope convention:** keep two scopes separate throughout the run:
- `finding_scope_root` — the user-requested audit subtree. Workers may only file findings whose vulnerable location is inside this subtree.
- `context_roots` — read-only repo roots/files workers and judges may inspect to verify reachability, callers, wrappers, build flags, mitigations, and threat-model details. Default to `.` unless the user explicitly forbids broader context. Reading context outside `finding_scope_root` is allowed; filing findings there is not.
---
## Rationalizations to Reject
- **"`unsafe` is rare, so hand-skip the memory-safety cluster."** Don't edit the cluster list — set `has_unsafe` accurately in Phase 1 and let `build_run_plan.py` decide. Every memory-safety bug class (UAF, double-free, uninitialized reads, `Vec::set_len`, union UB) requires `unsafe`, so the planner runs the **whole** `memory-safety` cluster when `has_unsafe=true` and correctly omits it when `false` — there is no "run it anyway." The **unsafe-boundary** cluster is different: it has no `requires` and always runs (consolidated; its safety-doc and `repr(C)` hygiene apply to FFI declarations even without visible `unsafe { }` blocks).
- **"The compiler caught it."** The borrow checker proves absence of safe-code data races; it proves nothing about unsafe blocks, panic reachability, ABBA deadlocks, atomic-load/store sequencing, or FFI ABI mismatch.
- **"`unwrap()` is fine if it's `// SAFETY: documented infallible`."** `// SAFETY:` documents `unsafe` operations, not infallibility claims. An `unwrap()` on documented-infallible input is still risky if the documentation is wrong — file as low severity and let the FP judge decide.
- **"`has_unsafe=false` so skip the run."** Pure safe-Rust crates still have panic-DoS, atomic races, drop-panics, and trait-implementation hazards. Run the always-on clusters.
- **"Background spawns parallelize the workers."** They do not — `Agent` calls in a single assistant message already run concurrently. `run_in_background=true` defeats the Phase 6a primer cache, so every worker pays full cache-creation (`cache_read_input_tokens=0`) and the ~15 K-token primer is wasted M times. Default: omit `run_in_background` from worker spawns.
- **"I'll re-derive the cluster list / paths / pass prefixes inline instead of running `build_run_plan.py`."** The script is the only authority for selection and rendering. Paraphrasing it drops fields that the worker self-check requires, producing `worker-N abort: spawn prompt malformed`. Always run the script and `Read plan.json`.
- **"The run partially succeeded — I'll just write `REPORT.md` from what completed."** Hiding partial runs behind a successful report is a correctness bug. If any Phase-5 cluster task is not `completed`, surface it prominently in `run-summary.md` and the final response.
- **"Zero findings — skip Phase 8."** Always run both judges and Phase 8b: dedup-judge writes a minimal no-op `dedup-summary.md` on an empty index, fp-judge writes empty `REPORT.md`/`REPORT.sarif`, and Phase 8b's SARIF generator emits `results: []` for the empty case. SARIF consumers depend on a stable artifact set.
- **"`Bash: ls README*` is fine for the preflight."** Under zsh, an unmatched glob aborts the whole compound command before `2>/dev/null` runs. Use `find` (never fails on no-match) — and not `Glob`, which is unavailable to an agent that also holds `Bash`.
---
## Orchestration Workflow
Run these phases **in the main conversation**.
### Phase 0: Parameter Collection
**Entry:** skill invoked. **Exit:** `threat_model`, `worker_model`, `severity_filter` resolved; `scope_subpath` resolved or set to `"."`; `finding_scope_root=scope_subpath`; `context_roots` resolved.
The skill is invoked directly (no command wrapper). Parse any free-text arguments the user passed on the `/rust-review:rust-review` line (e.g. `flamenco only`, `high severity only`, `use haiku`) and pre-fill the answers they imply — then ask for any missing required parameters with **one** `AskUserQuestion` call. Never silently default the required parameters.
Required parameters:
| Parameter | Values | How to infer from args |
|---|---|---|
| `threat_model` | `REMOTE` / `LOCAL_UNPRIVILEGED` / `BOTH` | Words like "remote", "network", "attacker" → `REMOTE`; "local", "unprivileged" → `LOCAL_UNPRIVILEGED`; otherwise ask. |
| `worker_model` | `haiku` / `sonnet` / `opus` | Explicit model name in args. Otherwise ask (no silent default). |
| `severity_filter` | `all` / `medium` / `high` | "all", "every", "noisy" → `all`; "medium and above" → `medium`; "high only", "criticals only" → `high`. Otherwise ask — **no silent default**. |
| `scope_subpath` | repo-relative directory (optional) | Phrases like "X only", "just audit X/", "review subdirectory X" → `src/X/` or the matching subdir. Apply fuzzy matching against top-level subdirectories of the repo. If absent, set `"."`; if ambiguous, ask. |
Call `AskUserQuestion` exactly once with only unresolved required parameters (`threat_model`, `worker_model`, `severity_filter`) plus `scope_subpath` only when the user explicitly requested a narrowed scope but it is ambiguous. If the required parameters were all pre-filled and scope is absent or resolved, skip the question.
After resolving `scope_subpath`, set `finding_scope_root="${scope_subpath:-.}"`. Set `context_roots="."` by default so workers can verify callers/build settings outside a narrowed subtree without filing out-of-scope findings. If the user explicitly asks to forbid broader context, set `context_roots="${finding_scope_root}"` and note that reachability confidence may be lower.
### Phase 1: Prerequisites
**Entry:** Phase 0 complete. **Exit:** `has_unsafe`, `has_ffi`, `has_concurrency`, `has_async`, `has_packed_repr`, `has_fs_io` flags determined. Abort with a clear message if no `*.rs` files exist under `${finding_scope_root}`.
First confirm `uv` is present (`command -v uv`) — every helper script from Phase 4 onward runs
through it. If missing, **abort** and tell the user to install it (`brew install uv` or
the official installer); nothing downstream can run without it.
Probe within `${finding_scope_root:-.}` with the `Bash` commands below (non-empty output ⇒ flag true). The dedicated `Grep`/`Glob` tools are unavailable to this orchestrator because it holds `Bash` — use `grep`/`rg`/`find` via `Bash`. (The probe regexes use `\s`/`\b`; if your `grep` lacks GNU `\s` support, run them with `rg -uu` — which honors `\s` and still searches ignored files — or, if `rg` is not installed either, replace `\s`→`[[:space:]]` and drop `\b`. Widening is safe here: a false-positive capability flag only adds a harmless extra worker, whereas a missed match would skip a whole pass.)
```bash
# Rust source presence (precondition)
find "${finding_scope_root:-.}" -name '*.rs' -print -quit
# has_unsafe
grep -rlE '\bunsafe\s+(extern|fn|impl|trait)\b|\bunsafe\s*\{' --include='*.rs' "${finding_scope_root:-.}" | head -1
# has_ffi
grep -rlE 'extern\s+"(C|system|stdcall|cdecl|win64|sysv64|aapcs|fastcall|thiscall|vectorcall|efiapi)(-unwind)?"|\bextern\s+fn\b|extern\s+\{|#\[repr\((C|transparent)\b|\b(CString|CStr)\b|use\s+(libc|core::ffi|std::ffi|std::os::raw|cty)|\blibc::|\b(bindgen|cbindgen)\b|\bc_void\b' --include='*.rs' "${finding_scope_root:-.}" | head -1
# has_concurrency
grep -rlE '\b(std::(thread|sync)|parking_lot::|crossbeam|rayon::|tokio::sync|core::sync::atomic|std::sync::atomic|Atomic[A-Za-z0-9_]*|UnsafeCell|static\s+mut|unsafe\s+impl\s+(Send|Sync)|memmap2::|Mmap(Options|Mut)?|MAP_SHARED|shm_open|mmap\s*\(|memfd_create|shared_memory|raw_sync|CreateFileMapping|MapViewOfFile|once_cell|sigaction|signal_hook|nix::sys::signal|libc::signal|libc::sigaction)' --include='*.rs' "${finding_scope_root:-.}" | head -1
# has_async
grep -rlE '\basync\s+(fn|move|\{)|\.await\b|tokio::|async_std::|futures::' --include='*.rs' "${finding_scope_root:-.}" | head -1
# has_packed_repr (outer #[repr(...packed...)] and inner #![repr(...packed...)])
grep -rlE '#!?\[repr\([^]]*packed' --include='*.rs' "${finding_scope_root:-.}" | head -1From trailofbits/skills, CC-BY-SA-4.0.
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Signals
- Stars
- 7,783
- Forks
- 671
- Open issues
- 30
- Last commit (this folder)
- Aug 19, 2026 (2 months ago)
From GitHub (fetched Oct 24, 2026).
Details
- License
- CC-BY-SA-4.0
- Repository
- github.com/trailofbits/skills
- First seen
- Oct 24, 2026
- Last checked
- Oct 24, 2026
- Source
- GitHubgithub-graphql
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Cite this page
rust-review skill. Agent Mart. https://agentmart.dev/skills/trailofbits-rust-review (last updated 2026-10-24)