harden
Security audit: threat model, OWASP Top 10 (and LLM Top 10), abuse cases, dependency and secret scan, with ranked findings and concrete fixes.
Skill by saleh-alhaddad
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Works with Claude Code, Claude apps, Codex, Cursor, Gemini CLI, GitHub Copilot, VS Code, OpenCode, Goose, Windsurf. Read the repository before you give any tool access to your data.
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About
Use cases: ml, security
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What this skill can do and what it asks for, from its SKILL.md and code. Checked Oct 25, 2026.
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Network hosts it talks to 1
codeload.github.com· found in install command
Files it touches
~/.claude/skills/harden
What's inside
- Skill name
harden- Description
- Security audit: threat model, OWASP Top 10 (and LLM Top 10), abuse cases, dependency and secret scan, with ranked findings and concrete fixes. Read-only.
- License
- MIT
- Instructions
- 160 lines in SKILL.md · view on GitHub
Files (1)
- SKILL.md
SKILL.md (first lines)
# harden — dedicated security review
Look at the system the way an attacker would, then report what a defender must fix. This is
the focused security pass; `inspect` covers general quality with a security *axis*, but a
real hardening review deserves its own depth.
Read [references/disciplines/security.md](../../references/disciplines/security.md) — the
shared security reference (STRIDE, OWASP Top 10 + LLM Top 10, secrets, abuse cases). Read
[CONVENTIONS.md](../../CONVENTIONS.md) for the workspace (§1), the ledger (§2), judgment (§4.1), the resume sweep (§5), git isolation (§11), multi-agent
rules (§8), grounding (§14), and freshness (§17 — check current CVEs/advisories against
today's date), and workspace integrity (§20).
**Journal every run (§2.1).** The first write of the run, once the task folder is resolved
(§20.1), is a START entry in the task's `log.md`; then set this phase `in_progress` in
`state.json`. Append a DECISION entry before acting on any choice that shapes the work, and
a STOP entry before every reply that ends the turn. Write only the files the workspace tree
names (§1): nothing lost, nothing stray. Before asking a question or deciding, check the
user's judgment (§4.1) for a confirmed rule that covers it, and journal who decided.
## Step 1 — Scope & threat model
**The iron rule: no finding without a reachable path from an attacker to an asset.** A
checklist item that fails in the abstract is not a finding until you can name who reaches it
and what they get. Build the model before auditing, in this order:
1. **Assets** — what is actually worth stealing or breaking here? Credentials, personal data,
money movement, the ability to act as another user, availability. Rank them; the audit's
attention follows this list, not the checklist's order.
2. **Entry points** — every place untrusted input enters: routes and handlers, webhooks,
queue consumers, file/image uploads, third-party callbacks, admin surfaces, CLI flags,
environment and config. **The API is the surface, not the UI** — enumerate endpoints from
the router, never from the screens.
3. **Actors and their starting privilege** — anonymous · self-registered user · another
tenant's user · low-privilege staff · compromised dependency · someone with a stolen
session. For each finding later, you will name which of these can reach it.
4. **Trust boundaries** — draw the lines where data crosses from one privilege level to
another. Every boundary is a place validation and authorization must exist; missing checks
cluster there.
5. **STRIDE per boundary** — spoofing · tampering · repudiation · information disclosure ·
denial of service · elevation of privilege. Walk the six against each boundary and keep
what is concrete for *this* system.
Load `security.md` for the checklist that the audit works through.
## Step 2 — Audit (read-only)
Work the checklist against the code and config:
- **Access control** — authz on every route/action, deny-by-default, no IDOR.
- **Injection & input** — parameterized queries, boundary validation.
- **Crypto & secrets** — TLS, encryption at rest, strong hashing; no secrets in code/logs
(scan the diff).
- **Auth & sessions** — rate-limited login, safe session/JWT handling.
- **Dependencies/supply chain** — known-vulnerable packages (web-check current advisories, §17).
- **SSRF, deserialization, misconfig, debug endpoints.**
- **LLM features** — prompt injection, unsafe tool permissions, data leakage.
In multi-agent mode, dispatch parallel auditors by category and merge; the orchestrator owns
writes (§8). Single-agent: work the checklist inline with fresh eyes.
**These thoughts mean stop — you are about to dismiss a real finding:**
| The thought | The reality |
|---|---|
| "It's internal-only, not exposed" | Internal networks get breached: model a **network-internal attacker** too. But rank by who can reach it, verified, not by the worst case imagined. |
| "You'd have to be logged in to hit it" | Check whether anyone can register (the signup route or its config, cited). Authenticated ≠ trusted either way. |
| "Another tenant couldn't reach this" | That is the claim to *test*, not assume — it is the definition of IDOR. |
| "No one would think to try that" | Attackers do this full-time and share notes. |
| "It's validated on the client" | Client validation is UX. The server is the boundary. |
| "That endpoint is old, nobody uses it" | Unused, reachable, and unmaintained is the ideal target. |
| "The framework probably handles it" | Probably is not a control. Read the config and confirm. |
Dismissing a finding is a decision with the same weight as raising one — it needs the same
evidence.
## Step 3 — Report
Write `security-review.md` in the task folder (bootstrap per §1), ranked by severity:
```
# Security review — <target> · <date>
### Coverage — entry points reviewed (file:line), and for each checklist item the read or
search that cleared it (absence claims show their searches, §5.2)
### Critical — exploitable now: <boundary violated> → <impact> → <fix>
### High — exploitable given a verified precondition / sensitive-data exposure
### Medium — defense-in-depth gaps
### Info — hardening suggestions
```
Every finding carries its **evidence**: a **source-to-sink trace** (where untrusted input
enters, file:line, through each step, to the dangerous operation, file:line) and its
**reachability, verified** (the route, the auth guard or its absence, the signup config,
cited). That is enough to rank it: `harden` reads and does not attack, so a traced,
reachable hole is ranked by the table above even though nothing was fired. A path with a step
you could not trace is labelled a **hypothesis**, and says which step is missing; unverified
reachability takes the lower rank, labelled unconfirmed. A committed secret is ranked by
what it grants, never "reproduced" by using it: when the grants cannot be confirmed without
using it, rank by what its name and location indicate (a key in `prod.env` grants production
access), labelled unconfirmed, and let the user confirm.
**Calibrate severity by reachability × impact, not by how alarming the category sounds.** When
the two columns point at different rows (reachable by anyone, but the impact reads like the
High row), take the more severe row and say which column set it:
| Rank | Who can reach it | What they get |
|---|---|---|
| **Critical** | anonymous, or any self-registered user | auth bypass · RCE · another tenant's data · money movement · mass data exposure |
| **High** | authenticated, or a precondition shown to hold | a single user's sensitive data · privilege escalation within a tenant · destructive action |
| **Medium** | needs an unlikely chain, or is a missing layer behind a working control | defense-in-depth gap · information leak that aids a bigger attack |
| **Info** | not reachable today | hardening that prevents a future mistake |
A category does not set the rank — a hardcoded key in a repo nobody can read is not Critical,
and a missing authorization check on one route is not Info.
A finding is valid only with a **violated boundary + demonstrated impact + a concrete fix**,
and each one names **which actor reaches it** (Step 1) — no speculative "could be risky".
Never invent a CVE or a vulnerability — verify and cite, or label it a hypothesis to confirm
(§14). **No secret is ever written into the report**: name the file and line, never the
value, and if a live credential is found say so plainly and treat rotation as part of the
fix — a leaked secret that was committed is already public to anyone with repo history.
## Step 3b — Variant analysis (report the class, not the instance)From saleh-alhaddad/itqan-engineering, MIT.
Signals
- Stars
- 12
- Forks
- 0
- Open issues
- 0
- Last commit (this folder)
- Sep 29, 2026 (1 month ago)
- Last release
- Sep 1, 2026 (2 months ago)
From GitHub (fetched Oct 24, 2026).
Details
- License
- MIT
- First seen
- Oct 24, 2026
- Last checked
- Oct 24, 2026
- Source
- GitHubgithub-graphql
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harden skill. Agent Mart. https://agentmart.dev/skills/saleh-alhaddad-harden (last updated 2026-10-24)