detecting-container-escape-attempts

Files (8)

• LICENSE
• SKILL.md
• template.md · assets/
• api-reference.md · references/
• standards.md · references/
• workflows.md · references/
• agent.py · scripts/
• process.py · scripts/

SKILL.md (first lines)

# Detecting Container Escape Attempts

## Overview

Container escape is a critical attack technique where an adversary breaks out of container isolation to access the host system or other containers. Detection involves monitoring for escape indicators such as namespace manipulation, capability abuse, kernel exploits, mounted sensitive paths, and anomalous syscall patterns using runtime security tools like Falco, Sysdig, and custom seccomp/audit rules.


## When to Use

- When investigating security incidents that require detecting container escape attempts
- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques

## Prerequisites

- Linux host with kernel 5.10+ (eBPF support)
- Falco 0.37+ installed (kernel module or eBPF probe)
- Docker Engine or containerd runtime
- auditd configured
- Root access for eBPF/kernel module loading

## Core Concepts

### Common Container Escape Vectors

| Vector | Technique | MITRE ID |
|--------|-----------|----------|
| Privileged containers | Mount host filesystem, load kernel modules | T1611 |
| Docker socket mount | Create privileged container from within | T1610 |
| Kernel exploits | CVE-2022-0185 (fsconfig), Dirty Pipe, runc CVEs | T1068 |
| Capability abuse | CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, CAP_NET_ADMIN | T1548 |
| Sensitive mounts | /proc/sysrq-trigger, /proc/kcore, cgroup release_agent | T1611 |
| Namespace escape | nsenter, unshare to host namespaces | T1611 |
| Symlink/bind mount | Escape through /proc/self/root | T1611 |

### Detection Layers

1. **Syscall monitoring** - eBPF/kernel module captures syscalls in real-time
2. **File integrity** - Detect modification of escape-enabling paths
3. **Process monitoring** - Track process creation, namespace changes
4. **Network monitoring** - Detect container-to-host connections
5. **Audit logging** - Linux auditd for capability and mount operations

## Workflow

### Step 1: Deploy Falco for Runtime Detection

```yaml
# falco-values.yaml for Helm deployment
falco:
  driver:
    kind: ebpf   # or modern_ebpf for kernel 5.8+
  rules_files:
    - /etc/falco/falco_rules.yaml
    - /etc/falco/falco_rules.local.yaml
    - /etc/falco/rules.d
  json_output: true
  json_include_output_property: true
  http_output:
    enabled: true
    url: "http://falcosidekick:2801"
  grpc:
    enabled: true
  priority: warning
```

```bash
# Install Falco via Helm
helm repo add falcosecurity https://falcosecurity.github.io/charts
helm install falco falcosecurity/falco \
  --namespace falco-system --create-namespace \
  -f falco-values.yaml
```

### Step 2: Custom Falco Rules for Escape Detection

```yaml
# /etc/falco/rules.d/container_escape.yaml

# Detect container escape via privileged container
- rule: Container Escape via Privileged Mode
  desc: Detect attempts to escape container using privileged capabilities
  condition: >
    spawned_process and container and
    (proc.name in (nsenter, unshare, mount, umount, modprobe, insmod) or
     (proc.name = chroot and proc.args contains "/host"))
  output: >
    Container escape attempt via privileged operation
    (user=%user.name container=%container.name image=%container.image.repository
     command=%proc.cmdline pid=%proc.pid %container.info)
  priority: CRITICAL
  tags: [container, escape, T1611]

# Detect Docker socket access from container
- rule: Container Access to Docker Socket
  desc: Detect container reading/writing to Docker socket
  condition: >
    (open_read or open_write) and container and
    fd.name = /var/run/docker.sock
  output: >
    Docker socket accessed from container
    (user=%user.name container=%container.name image=%container.image.repository
     fd=%fd.name command=%proc.cmdline %container.info)
  priority: CRITICAL
  tags: [container, escape, docker_socket]

# Detect sensitive proc filesystem access
- rule: Container Access to Sensitive Proc Paths
  desc: Detect container accessing host-sensitive proc paths
  condition: >
    open_read and container and
    (fd.name startswith /proc/sysrq-trigger or
     fd.name startswith /proc/kcore or
     fd.name startswith /proc/kmsg or
     fd.name startswith /proc/kallsyms or
     fd.name startswith /sys/kernel)
  output: >
    Sensitive proc/sys access from container
    (user=%user.name container=%container.name path=%fd.name

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