auditing-kubernetes-rbac-privilege-escalation
Finds over-permissive RBAC roles and service-account token abuse paths in a Kubernetes cluster using kubectl auth can-i, rbac-police, kubectl-who-can, and…
Skill by mukul975
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Use cases: devops, security
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What this skill can do and what it asks for, from its SKILL.md and code. Checked Oct 25, 2026.
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~/.claude/skills/auditing-kubernetes-rbac-privilege-escalation
What's inside
- Skill name
auditing-kubernetes-rbac-privilege-escalation- Description
- Finds over-permissive RBAC roles and service-account token abuse paths in a Kubernetes cluster using kubectl auth can-i, rbac-police, kubectl-who-can, and rakkess, tracing which subjects can escalate toward cluster-admin. Use when reviewing who can escalate privileges in a cluster, hunting exploitable RoleBindings during an authorized review, or validating least privilege after an RBAC change. Keywords: RBAC, ClusterRoleBinding, service account token, auth can-i, rbac-police, escalate, bind, impersonate. Do not use for designing and applying hardened RBAC - use implementing-rbac-hardening-for-kubernetes.
- License
- Apache-2.0
- Instructions
- 240 lines in SKILL.md · view on GitHub
Before installing
- Ships executable scripts
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Files (5)
- LICENSE
- SKILL.md
- api-reference.md · references/
- standards.md · references/
- agent.py · scripts/
SKILL.md (first lines)
# Auditing Kubernetes RBAC Privilege Escalation
> **Legal Notice:** This skill is for authorized security testing and educational purposes only. Enumerating and exercising RBAC permissions affects a live cluster's access posture. Only test clusters you own or are explicitly authorized in writing to assess.
## Overview
Kubernetes Role-Based Access Control (RBAC, MITRE ATT&CK T1078 Valid Accounts) governs what every user and service account may do via `Role`/`ClusterRole` rules bound by `RoleBinding`/`ClusterRoleBinding`. Because workloads run with a mounted service-account token by default, an attacker who compromises one pod inherits that account's RBAC rights. Over-permissive bindings turn a single compromised pod into a cluster takeover: certain verbs and resources are "RBAC-equivalent to cluster-admin."
Per the Kubernetes "RBAC Good Practices" guidance and Unit 42 research, the dangerous primitives are:
- **`escalate` on roles** — grant yourself any permission, even ones you do not hold.
- **`bind` on clusterroles** — create a binding to `cluster-admin`.
- **`impersonate`** on users/groups/serviceaccounts — act as any subject including `system:masters`.
- **`create`/`update`/`patch` on `pods`** — schedule a privileged pod or mount the node, escaping to the host (T1611).
- **`create` on `pods/exec`, `pods/attach`, `pods/ephemeralcontainers`** — run code in any existing pod.
- **`get`/`list`/`watch` on `secrets`** — list returns full secret contents, including other service-account tokens.
- **`create` on `serviceaccounts/token`** — mint tokens for more privileged accounts.
- **`update`/`patch` on `validatingwebhookconfigurations`/`mutatingwebhookconfigurations`, `nodes/proxy`, `certificatesigningrequests/approval`** — admission/CSR abuse to cluster-admin.
- **Wildcards** (`verbs: ["*"]`, `resources: ["*"]`) — implicit super-privilege.
This skill systematically enumerates effective permissions for every subject, maps which subjects hold these escalation primitives, and produces remediation evidence. Source: Kubernetes RBAC Good Practices; Unit 42 Kubernetes RBAC research.
## When to Use
- During an authorized Kubernetes security assessment or cluster penetration test
- After compromising a pod, to determine what its service-account token can reach
- When reviewing RBAC drift before a production go-live
- When validating least-privilege after a platform migration or Helm rollout
## Prerequisites
- `kubectl` configured against the target cluster (your own credentials, or a captured service-account token)
- Read access to RBAC objects (most audits run with a cluster-reader or admin context)
- Audit tooling:
```bash
# rbac-police - find escalation paths (Cymulate)
curl -L https://github.com/PaloAltoNetworks/rbac-police/releases/latest/download/rbac-police-linux-amd64 -o rbac-police
chmod +x rbac-police
# kubectl-who-can - which subjects can perform an action (Aqua)
kubectl krew install who-can
# rakkess - access matrix of resources x verbs for the current/another subject
kubectl krew install access-matrix
# rbac-lookup - which roles a subject has (FairwindsOps)
kubectl krew install rbac-lookup
```
## Objectives
- Inventory all `Role`, `ClusterRole`, `RoleBinding`, and `ClusterRoleBinding` objects
- Enumerate effective permissions per subject using `kubectl auth can-i --as`
- Identify subjects holding RBAC-equivalent-to-admin primitives
- Trace token-mounting pods to over-privileged service accounts
- Demonstrate (in a lab) one escalation path end-to-end
- Output a prioritized findings report with least-privilege remediation
## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
| Technique ID | Name | Tactic |
|--------------|------|--------|
| T1078 | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion / Persistence / Privilege Escalation |
| T1098 | Account Manipulation | Persistence |
| T1528 | Steal Application Access Token | Credential Access |
| T1613 | Container and Resource Discovery | Discovery |
| T1611 | Escape to Host | Privilege Escalation |
## Workflow
### Step 1: Inventory RBAC Objects
```bash
# All roles and bindings, cluster-wide
kubectl get clusterroles,clusterrolebindings -o wide
kubectl get roles,rolebindings --all-namespaces -o wide
# Dump full RBAC for offline analysis
kubectl get clusterroles,clusterrolebindings,roles,rolebindings \
--all-namespaces -o yaml > rbac-dump.yaml
# Who is bound to cluster-admin?
kubectl get clusterrolebindings -o json | \
jq -r '.items[] | select(.roleRef.name=="cluster-admin") |
.metadata.name + " -> " + (.subjects // [] | map(.kind+"/"+.name) | join(","))'
```
### Step 2: Enumerate Effective Permissions per Subject
`kubectl auth can-i` is the authoritative check because it evaluates the live authorizer (RBAC + webhooks). Use `--as` to impersonate a subject (requires impersonate rights for the audit identity).
```bash
# Full access matrix for a service account
kubectl auth can-i --list \
--as=system:serviceaccount:default:default
# Targeted dangerous-permission probes
kubectl auth can-i create pods --all-namespaces \
--as=system:serviceaccount:dev:builder
kubectl auth can-i get secrets --all-namespaces \
--as=system:serviceaccount:dev:builder
kubectl auth can-i create serviceaccounts/token -n kube-system \
--as=system:serviceaccount:dev:builder
kubectl auth can-i '*' '*' --all-namespaces \
--as=system:serviceaccount:dev:builder
# rakkess full verb x resource matrix for a subject
kubectl access-matrix --as system:serviceaccount:dev:builder
```
### Step 3: Hunt the Escalation Primitives
```bash
# Who can perform each dangerous action across the cluster?
kubectl who-can create pods
kubectl who-can '*' '*' # wildcard god-mode holders
kubectl who-can get secrets
kubectl who-can list secrets
kubectl who-can create pods/exec
kubectl who-can impersonate usersFrom mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills, Apache-2.0.
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Signals
- Stars
- 34,941
- Forks
- 4,256
- Open issues
- 24
- Last commit (this folder)
- Aug 23, 2026 (2 months ago)
- Last release
- Jun 22, 2026 (4 months ago)
From GitHub (fetched Oct 24, 2026).
Details
- License
- Apache-2.0
- First seen
- Oct 24, 2026
- Last checked
- Oct 24, 2026
- Source
- GitHubgithub-graphql
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auditing-kubernetes-rbac-privilege-escalation skill. Agent Mart. https://agentmart.dev/skills/mukul975-auditing-kubernetes-rbac-privilege-escalation (last updated 2026-10-24)