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stripe-webhook-idempotency

Stripe-specific webhook idempotency -- signature verification with the constructEvent API, retry-id reuse via `event.id`, double-fulfilment guards on…

Skill by MILTONADINA

IndexedMIT
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About

Stripe-specific webhook idempotency -- signature verification with the constructEvent API, retry-id reuse via `event.id`, double-fulfilment guards on PaymentIntent / Charge / Invoice events. Extends the universal `security/webhook-idempotency` skill with Stripe's event-id discipline and signing-secret rotation patterns. Triggers on Stripe webhook handler authoring (`stripe.webhooks.constructEvent` references, Stripe-Signature header handling). OWASP ASI02 (Tool Misuse) defense.

Use cases: backend, security, finance

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What this skill can do and what it asks for, from its SKILL.md. Checked Oct 25, 2026.

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  • codeload.github.com · found in install command

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  • ~/.claude/skills/stripe-webhook-idempotency

What's inside

Skill name
stripe-webhook-idempotency
Description
Stripe-specific webhook idempotency -- signature verification with the constructEvent API, retry-id reuse via `event.id`, double-fulfilment guards on PaymentIntent / Charge / Invoice events. Extends the universal `security/webhook-idempotency` skill with Stripe's event-id discipline and signing-secret rotation patterns. Triggers on Stripe webhook handler authoring (`stripe.webhooks.constructEvent` references, Stripe-Signature header handling). OWASP ASI02 (Tool Misuse) defense.
License
MIT
Instructions
246 lines in SKILL.md · view on GitHub

Agent Skills spec issues

  • name: "stripe-webhook-idempotency" does not match folder "webhook-idempotency"

Files (1)

  • SKILL.md

SKILL.md (first lines)

# Stripe Webhook Idempotency

> Stripe-specific extension of the universal
> [`security/webhook-idempotency`](../../../universal/security/webhook-idempotency/SKILL.md)
> skill. Read that first for the provider-agnostic patterns
> (idempotency-key, replay-window, storage strategies). This skill layers
> Stripe's specifics on top: `constructEvent` for signature verification,
> `event.id` discipline, signing-secret rotation, and the per-event-type
> fulfilment guards that close ASI02 (Tool Misuse) for Stripe handlers.

**Tradeoff:** Stripe is the highest-volume webhook surface for most
applications and Stripe events drive money-moving side effects -- the
strictest place to get idempotency right. The cost: extra discipline on
signature verification, event-id handling, and event-type-specific
fulfilment checks beyond what the universal pattern provides.

---

## Why this matters

Stripe retries webhook delivery for up to 3 days on transient failures.
Every retry that lands after the receiver successfully processed the
event (but before the response made it back) is a duplicate. Production
incidents from missing this:

- Two charges on the same `payment_intent.succeeded`.
- Two emails on the same `invoice.payment_succeeded`.
- Two database updates on the same `customer.subscription.updated`.
- Stale fulfilment if a later retry of an earlier event arrives after a
  newer event has already been processed.

The universal patterns close the dedupe-key gap. Stripe-specific patterns
close the verification + fulfilment-guard gaps.

---

## Pattern 1 -- Verify the signature with `constructEvent`, not raw HMAC

Stripe signs every webhook delivery with the signing secret you set when
creating the webhook endpoint in the Stripe dashboard (or via the API).
Use `stripe.webhooks.constructEvent` -- it verifies the signature AND
parses the event into a typed `Stripe.Event`. Never roll your own HMAC
compare against the raw body; the library handles signature-version
quirks, replay-window enforcement, and constant-time comparison.

```ts
import Stripe from 'stripe';

const stripe = new Stripe(process.env.STRIPE_SECRET_KEY!);
const SIGNING_SECRET = process.env.STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET!;

async function handleStripeWebhook(rawBody: string, signature: string) {
  let event: Stripe.Event;
  try {
    event = stripe.webhooks.constructEvent(rawBody, signature, SIGNING_SECRET);
  } catch (err) {
    // Invalid signature, malformed payload, OR replay-window exceeded
    // (Stripe SDK's default tolerance is 300 seconds).
    return new Response('invalid signature', { status: 400 });
  }
  // event is now a verified Stripe.Event with typed event.data.object.
}
```

Crucially: pass the RAW request body (the unparsed bytes), not a re-
serialized JSON. Next.js / Express / FastAPI / Fastify all have a
"raw body" middleware mode you must enable on the webhook route. A
re-serialized body has different bytes than what Stripe signed; verification
fails. This is the #1 first-time Stripe webhook failure mode.

---

## Pattern 2 -- Use `event.id` as the idempotency key, never derive from body

Stripe assigns every event a unique `event.id` (format `evt_...`). This is
the canonical retry identifier; Stripe guarantees the same id across
delivery attempts of the same event. Use it directly as your dedupe key
in whichever storage strategy fits your throughput profile (see the
universal skill for the Redis-TTL / DB-unique-constraint / in-memory
tradeoff).

```ts
const dedupeKey = `stripe:event:${event.id}`;
const claimed = await redis.set(dedupeKey, 'processing', { NX: true, EX: 86400 * 4 });
if (claimed !== 'OK') {
  return new Response('duplicate (idempotent)', { status: 200 });
}
```

The 4-day TTL covers Stripe's full 3-day retry schedule plus headroom.
Anything shorter risks a very-late retry slipping past your dedupe window.

---

## Pattern 3 -- Per-event-type fulfilment guards

`stripe.webhooks.constructEvent` returns a discriminated-union typed event.
Switch on `event.type` and apply fulfilment-state checks specific to that
type, NOT just the idempotency-key check. The idempotency key prevents
double-processing of the SAME event; fulfilment guards prevent processing
events in the wrong order.

```ts
switch (event.type) {
  case 'payment_intent.succeeded': {
    const pi = event.data.object;  // typed Stripe.PaymentIntent
    // Guard: do not fulfill if order is already shipped.
    const order = await db.order.findUnique({ where: { piId: pi.id } });
    if (order?.status === 'fulfilled') {
      return new Response('already fulfilled', { status: 200 });
    }
    await fulfillOrder({ orderId: order!.id, paymentIntentId: pi.id });
    break;
  }
  case 'charge.refunded': {
    const charge = event.data.object;  // typed Stripe.Charge
    await markOrderRefunded({ chargeId: charge.id });
    break;
  }

From MILTONADINA/DevOPs, MIT.

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12
Last commit (this folder)
May 23, 2026 (5 months ago)
Last release
Sep 23, 2026 (1 month ago)

From GitHub (fetched Oct 24, 2026).

Details

License
MIT
First seen
Oct 24, 2026
Last checked
Oct 24, 2026

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stripe-webhook-idempotency skill. Agent Mart. https://agentmart.dev/skills/miltonadina-stripe-webhook-idempotency (last updated 2026-10-24)