Skip to content
Agentmart
Submit a tool

Biii

Fail-closed safe-to-pay verdicts on Base: known-bad wallets, look-alike tokens, repeat rug funders.

Connector by philpof102-svg · GitHub account verified by the MCP Registry

IndexedLicense unknownLocal (stdio)Remote (HTTP)
Write a review

Install

Works with Claude Code, VS Code, Codex, Cursor, Windsurf, Claude Desktop. Read the repository before you give any tool access to your data.

npx agentmarket install connector/philpof102-svg-biii

Asks which of your tools to add it to (Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, VS Code, Windsurf, Gemini CLI, Claude Desktop) and shows the change first. See https://agentmart.dev/cli.

Remote endpoint

  • https://biii-production.up.railway.app/mcp Remote (HTTP)

Get the weekly diff

The weekly diff: one email a week with new agent tools, notable updates and grade changes, plus security alerts for tools you follow. Double opt-in, one-click unsubscribe.

We use your email only for this newsletter. Privacy

About

Fail-closed safe-to-pay verdicts on Base: known-bad wallets, look-alike tokens, repeat rug funders.

No reviews yet. Installed it? Reviews come from verified installers only. How reviews work

Permissions

What this server can do and what it asks for, from its tool list and install config. Checked Oct 25, 2026.

Tools
8 read · 5 write · 0 delete · 16 not yet classified
Secrets
None asked for
Install scripts
Not scanned yet
Runs as
Node.js package

Tools by what they do 29

From the running server's own tool list (tools/list) on Oct 25, 2026.

Read 8 · Look things up without changing anything.

  • till_b20_authentic
  • till_check_invoice
  • till_check_payment
  • till_funder_history
  • till_verify_delivery
  • till_vet_agent
  • till_vet_asset
  • till_watch_wallet

Write 5 · Create, change, send or run things.

  • till_create_charge
  • till_create_invoice
  • till_resolve
  • till_seed_exposure
  • till_trace_theft

Not yet classified 16 · We could not tell from the name and description.

  • till_authorize
  • till_export
  • till_floor
  • till_key_exposure
  • till_kya
  • till_launch_funder
  • till_meter
  • till_open_approvals
  • till_receipt
  • till_recovery_offer
  • till_roll
  • till_rug_powers
Show 4 more tools
  • till_trust
  • till_vet_approach
  • till_vet_meme
  • till_vet_merchant

Network hosts it talks to 1

  • biii-production.up.railway.app · found in remote endpoint, install command

Files it touches

  • Any path the agent passes to its tools

Tools (29)

As the server listed them on Oct 25, 2026. Descriptions are the server’s own words; hidden characters are shown as [U+…].

  • till_authorize

    SPEND AUTHORIZATION (Skyfire Programmable Payment): create a charge AND check it against what the agent's OWNER signed off — token, recipient allow-list, per-charge max, AND the cumulative cap. Fail-closed and drain-safe: an EIP-681 payment intent is issued ONLY if the charge is authorized (ten small charges cannot beat a low cap). BIII does not verify the authorization JWT signature itself — pass verified:true after checking it, or supply a spendAuth object. The caller tracks spentMicro (BIII is stateless).

  • till_b20_authentic

    IS THIS A REAL BASE-NATIVE B20, OR AN ERC-20 WEARING ITS ADDRESS PREFIX? B20 is Base's native standard for compliant asset issuance (stablecoins, RWA); its tokens sit at addresses starting 0xb200 and run as a precompile, so a genuine one carries almost no EVM bytecode. As people learn to read 0xb200 as "official Base asset", a plain ERC-20 at a vanity address of the same prefix inherits that credibility for free — landing on it by chance is about 1 in 65,536. Both outcomes matter and differ: an impostor lacks the issuer controls the standard implies, while a GENUINE B20 lets its issuer freeze …

  • till_check_invoice

    Check an invoice against the chain: settled (paid on-chain, field-for-field) / overdue / issued / not_observable (settles on a rail BIII cannot read — ask the merchant's books, never assume unpaid). If settled, returns the receipt for the registry.

  • till_check_payment

    Watch Base for the USDC transfer paying a charge and verify it FIELD-FOR-FIELD (wrong chain/token/recipient/underpay/unconfirmed = NOT paid). Only the chain says paid — verification is chain-only and never depends on any trust signal. Pass withTrust:true to ALSO get the payee's advisory MainStreet trust in the same call (advisory, never changes the paid verdict).

  • till_create_charge

    Create a USDC-on-Base charge for a real-world merchant. Returns the charge + the EIP-681 payment URI your OWN wallet must execute (basetill holds no key, moves no funds).

  • till_create_invoice

    Create a Web2-style INVOICE (number, line items, due date, bill-to) on the SAME non-custodial registry: paid by the same EIP-681 intent, verified by the same chain discipline, recorded in the same provable till roll. Returns the invoice + a human-readable bill (EN/FR) + the payment URI.

  • till_export

    ACCOUNTING EXPORT: turn the verified receipts into an accountant-ready CSV that QuickBooks / Xero / Excel import (the export finance teams need to adopt). Every row carries its own txHash + Basescan link, so the accountant re-verifies each amount on Base themselves — the export is a POINTER to the chain, never a book to trust. Non-custodial (BIII moved no funds). Columns: date, receipt_no, reference, description, payer, gross_usdc, tip_usdc, charged_usdc, token, chain, tx_hash, basescan_url, status. Dedup by txHash; optional block-time window; brand slugs the filename. WINDOW HONESTY: a receip…

  • till_floor

    DECENTRALIZATION PROOF: the provenance + content-FINGERPRINT of this node's known-bad floor. Two nodes with the SAME fingerprint judge on the SAME floor — sameness is a checkable fact, not an operator's word. The floor is re-derivable from named public open-licensed lists (run scripts/biii-known-bad-ingest.js and confirm the hash), so convergence is on PUBLIC DATA + a deterministic hash, never on a central node. Compare fingerprints across nodes to prove they share the same objective floor.

  • till_funder_history

    HAS THE WALLET THAT PAID FOR THIS LAUNCH ALREADY KILLED ONE? till_launch_funder reads the graph and tells you a cluster exists; this reads our OWN observation record and tells you what happened to the rest of it. The distinction matters because every other check here asks the token a question it cannot answer in time: a curated security index returns an owner address for roughly one Base token in ten, so "who can still fire a rug power" — the question this whole scanner was built on — came back unanswerable on 221 of 221 launches we watched. Who PAID is answerable, because we watched that ours…

  • till_key_exposure

    WHAT KEY MATERIAL IS ON THIS DISK, AND WHAT STILL HOLDS AN OLD COPY OF IT? The companion to till_seed_exposure, and it exists because a real theft happened without the phrase ever being written down: the key was exfiltrated. The trap is that a secp256k1 private key is 64 hex characters and so is every SHA-256 hash, git object id and transaction hash in a saved response, so the value SHAPE carries almost no information. Two things do: STRUCTURE (a Web3 Secret Storage keystore has version 3 and a crypto member with ciphertext, kdf and mac — nothing else looks like that, and finding one is not an…

  • till_kya

    IDENTITY STANDARD (interop): read a Skyfire KYA ("Know Your Agent") JWT — the signed token binding a real human/business to an agent (Experian's identity layer). The IDENTITY counterpart to till_trust's ERC-8004 reputation lens. Parses the JWT + validates fail-closed (iss/sub present, not expired, aud matches YOU — anti-replay), and treats it as ATTESTED only when you confirm the signature verified against the issuer JWKS (BIII does not verify JWT signatures itself — no dep; supply verified:true or re-verify with the pointer). Advisory: attesting WHO backs an agent is NOT "safe to pay" — run t…

  • till_launch_funder

    WHO PAID FOR THIS LAUNCH, AND WHAT ELSE DID THEY PAY FOR? Follows the money backwards: a token names its creator, a creator minted minutes ago names the wallet that funded it, and that funder usually funded others. Three free explorer queries surface a cluster no buyer can see from a chart. Proven live: one funder had sent an identical 15.020 ETH to 26 fresh wallets. Reports STRUCTURE ONLY — a shared funder proves shared control or shared infrastructure, never fraud; a launchpad and a rug factory are indistinguishable from the graph. What it does prove is that these tokens share fate and shoul…

  • till_meter

    USAGE → BILL for a white-label pilot, split by trust. The settled receipts are ON-CHAIN (each txHash re-verifiable on Base — the PROVABLE basis for receipt charges); the verdict count is SELF-REPORTED (verdicts are advisory reads, not chain artifacts) and labeled as such. The pricing plan is INJECTED (the partner brings their tiers). Pure, stateless, non-custodial (BIII holds no ledger). Returns the provable/self-reported split + itemized charges + total. WINDOW HONESTY: a receipt with no on-chain block time is excluded from a DATED window (its date cannot be proven) and counted in provable.un…

  • till_open_approvals

    WHICH DOORS INTO THIS WALLET ARE STILL OPEN? An ERC-20 approval is a standing permission to move your tokens without asking again, and it is the most common drain vector that does NOT require the private key: you approved a contract once for an unlimited amount and forgot. Wallets do not surface these, so almost nobody knows what they have granted. The load-bearing discipline: an Approval EVENT IS NOT THE CURRENT STATE — a later approval of zero revokes an earlier one silently, so the log is used only to find candidate (token, spender) pairs and every one is then confirmed by calling allowance…

  • till_receipt

    Produce the chain-anchored receipt for a VERIFIED payment (txHash + basescan link). Refuses without verification.

Show 14 more tools
  • till_recovery_offer

    THE SECOND THEFT: judge an approach offering to recover already-stolen funds. Every other tool here tries to stop the first loss; this exists because the first loss is what makes a person findable, and a drained wallet is a lead with a market for it. Answerable with certainty rather than a score, because the ask itself is the tell: recovery happens through the thief returning funds, or a court, exchange, or issuer freezing and reassigning them — none of which require anything from the victim's wallet. So a recovery needing your signature or an upfront fee is not merely suspect, it is structura…

  • till_resolve

    IDENTITY BRIDGE: resolve an AGENT identity — a buzz/Nostr npub (64-hex secp256k1) AND/OR a gitlawb did:key (Ed25519) — to a payable, trust-assessable BASE address, trustlessly. The binding is a BIDIRECTIONAL attestation: each identity key AND the Base key sign the same canonical message, so anyone re-verifies the signatures (BIII never takes your word). A binding needs AT LEAST one identity key (npub or did). Fail-closed: unverified / an identity key missing its signature / expired / un-nonced / malformed ⇒ a CLAIM, not a binding (bound:false). BIII does not verify secp256k1/Ed25519 itself (no…

  • till_roll

    PROVABLE BOOKS: render an agent/merchant's till roll — a shareable statement where EVERY line carries its own txHash + basescan link, so the reader re-verifies each payment on Base themselves (trust no one, not even BIII). This is the substitute for the settlement statement an excluded merchant/agent loses when they leave a PSP. Pure and non-custodial (BIII holds no funds). Pass the verified receipts you collected from till_receipt.

  • till_rug_powers

    WHO CAN STILL RUG THIS TOKEN? till_vet_meme says which contract is the real one; this says whether the real one is itself a trap. A dangerous capability only counts if someone can still FIRE it — mintable with ownership renounced is inert, the same flag with a live owner is an armed rug, and scoring flags without that distinction is why most scanners are noise. Merges two sources that fail at opposite ends: a curated index (owner powers, LP locks) that has never heard of a token minted ten minutes ago, and a live trade simulation that always works on fresh deploys but sees nothing about contro…

  • till_seed_exposure

    IS A RECOVERY PHRASE SITTING IN CLEARTEXT ON THIS MACHINE? Everything else here answers whether an ADDRESS is safe to pay; this answers whether the MACHINE is safe to hold a wallet, and a safe address on a compromised machine is worth nothing. "Self custody if you know how to keep your seedphrase safe" puts the whole condition in the sentence and nothing ships that checks it: an antivirus answers "do you have a known virus", which is a different question. This one is DECIDABLE rather than scored. A keyword scan drowns — abandon, able, about and absent are ordinary English and all four are BIP-…

  • till_trace_theft

    FOLLOW STOLEN FUNDS from the victim's transaction to where the trail dies. Three modes. moved: what actually left a wallet in one transaction, marking which transfers are AUTHENTIC — ERC-20 Transfer logs are attacker-controlled text, so only the transaction signer is authoritative and forged events are flagged rather than followed. bridge: read a cross-chain exit; aggregators write the destination chain and receiver into their own calldata because the far side needs them, and chain ids are checked against a table before any field is called an amount (0x2b6653dc reads as a plausible token amoun…

  • till_trust

    The TRUST TRIANGLE in one call: composes reputation, standing (LAWBOR proven history, if BIII_LAWBOR_URL set) and settlement (on-chain, if amountMicro given) into ONE verdict (unsafe/unknown/trusted/settled). Reputation is shown as TWO LENSES kept SEPARATE, never merged: `local` = this node's known-bad screen against public lists (no network, decisive — a BLOCK overrides everything) and `oracle` = MainStreet's advisory read (ORACLE-REPORTED, can raise trust but never lower a local block). Fail-closed: absence is never trust; a local BLOCK holds even if the oracle is down. Every verdict carries…

  • till_verify_delivery

    I CAN PROVE I PAID. CAN I PROVE I WAS SERVED? Every other check here runs before money moves; this is the question after, and it is the one nothing in this market answers. A payment is a fact on Base that anyone can re-check forever; the deliverable was a sentence in a message. So a buyer can prove it spent and cannot prove it received — and every settlement record in existence, including the ones this server writes, records the money and takes the goods on trust. The fix is a commitment, not an opinion: the seller publishes sha256(deliverable) BEFORE being paid, the buyer hashes what arrived …

  • till_vet_agent

    IS THIS AGENT SAFE TO CONNECT TO, AND SAFE TO PAY? The gap this closes: everything else here judges tokens, launches, thefts and wallets, but never the AGENT — which is the thing that actually holds the tools. Four checkable dangers, none of which require trusting a word of the description. It does not exist (a listing is not a service, and paying an endpoint that never answers is the simplest loss available). Its tools can move money (a name is marketing; the input SCHEMA is the capability, and only a QUANTITY field proves a payment surface, because a message has a recipient exactly as a paym…

  • till_vet_approach

    JUDGE AN INBOUND OPPORTUNITY BY ITS ASK, NOT BY HOW GOOD IT LOOKS (podcast, interview, partnership, job, AMA). Built from a lure that worked on someone who verifies counterparties professionally: a 35-question production dossier citing his real scoring model, his settlement rails, his own catchphrase, quoting his posts verbatim — and asking genuinely HARD questions, because a flatterer never includes criticism and including it is what flips an approach from marketing to journalism in the reader's head. The mechanism is EFFORT AS A TRUST SIGNAL: that much researched detail used to cost hours of…

  • till_vet_asset

    Is a TOKENIZED ASSET (stock/treasury/RWA) contract the GENUINE issuer's, or an impersonator? genuine / impersonation / unsafe / unknown — fail-closed (unknown is never genuine). Catches the FBI-flagged lookalike-token fraud. Registry is authoritative: seed only; source real addresses from issuer official docs.

  • till_vet_meme

    Which contract is the REAL memecoin among 10+ look-alikes? Fail-closed verdict from live market data (DexScreener). Returns: genuine (one contract dominates liquidity), ambiguous (top-2 tied — never certified), impersonation (the address you passed is NOT the dominant one), thin (no credible liquidity). Advisory + re-verifiable. ALSO returns `observedRisk`, kept SEPARATE from the verdict on purpose: `status` answers IDENTITY ("is this the contract you think it is?"), `observedRisk` carries what this node has MEASURED about outcomes. Its rate is WITHHELD unless the bound is verified — the readi…

  • till_vet_merchant

    MainStreet safe-to-pay preflight on a merchant address. Returns the hosted oracle read (advisory) AND a LOCAL CLASSIFIER verdict computed on this node via trust-core (pure, zero-oracle) — so a verdict holds even if the oracle is down. Vet the RECIPIENT before paying.

  • till_watch_wallet

    WHAT CHANGED AROUND THIS WALLET SINCE WE LAST LOOKED? The other tools answer at a point in time; this is what turns them into a guard, because it REMEMBERS and therefore distinguishes a new door from an old one. Three unlimited approvals granted last year are a standing condition; a fourth appearing this morning is an event, and only the second deserves to interrupt anyone — a monitor that repeats its standing conditions every run teaches its reader to close it, and a closed monitor is worth nothing. Detects new live allowances and first-time counterparties, using TRANSACTIONS rather than even…

Signals

Stars
0
Forks
0
Open issues
0
Last commit
Aug 20, 2026 (2 months ago)
Last release
Jul 27, 2026 (3 months ago)

From GitHub (fetched Oct 24, 2026).

Details

Registry name
io.github.philpof102-svg/biii
Version
0.2.1
Auth
Auth not stated
Packages
npm biii-mcp
License
License unknown
First seen
Oct 24, 2026
Last checked
Oct 24, 2026

More from philpof102-svg

Cite this page

Biii MCP server. Agent Mart. https://agentmart.dev/connectors/philpof102-svg-biii (last updated 2026-10-24)