Firewall AIops

[READ] List filter rules (optionally on one interface), normalized. Args: interface: Optional interface name to filter by (e.g. wan, lan). target: Firewall target name from config; omit for the default.

[READ] 1:1 NAT mappings (external ↔ internal), normalized. Args: target: Firewall target name from config; omit for the default.

[READ] Outbound (source) NAT mappings, normalized. Args: target: Firewall target name from config; omit for the default.

[READ] Inbound port-forward (DNAT) rules, normalized. Args: target: Firewall target name from config; omit for the default.

[READ] OpenVPN sessions / connected clients (name, address, bytes). Args: target: Firewall target name from config; omit for the default.

[READ] The staged rule set apply_changes would commit, with lockout risk. Run this BEFORE apply_changes. It reports whether committing the staged rules would cut the endpoint this tool manages the firewall through — a disabled 'pass' rule that permits management access, or an enabled 'block' rule that covers it. Findings are ranked worst-first and carry a `certain` flag: certain ones make apply_changes refuse, uncertain ones (alias destinations, 'any', interface groups) are warnings only and never block. `basis` states what this is: the staged rule STATE, not a diff against the running confi…

[WRITE][risk=high] Reboot the firewall. IRREVERSIBLE — audit only, no undo. Pass dry_run=True to preview. Args: dry_run: If True, preview without rebooting. target: Firewall target name from config; omit for the default.

[WRITE][risk=high] Reload/commit a subsystem's config (filter/nat/aliases). Reloading the 'filter' subsystem commits the staged rule set just as apply_changes does, so it carries the same lockout guard and the same override. Args: subsystem: Config subsystem to reload (filter, nat, aliases). dry_run: If True, preview without reconfiguring. override: Proceed despite a certain lockout finding (filter subsystem). target: Firewall target name from config; omit for the default.

[WRITE][risk=medium] Remove one entry from an alias; reversible (undo adds it back). Captures the alias' prior entries before the change. Pass dry_run=True to preview. Args: name: Alias name (from list_aliases). entry: The host/network/port to remove. dry_run: If True, preview without changing. target: Firewall target name from config; omit for the default.

[WRITE][risk=medium] Restart a firewall service (unbound, dhcpd, openvpn, ...). REFUSES the service that answers this appliance's own management API (nginx / lighttpd / configd / webgui and friends): restarting it kills the connection this tool is using, so the restart cannot be observed and the undo cannot run. Restart those from the console instead. Pass dry_run=True to preview. Args: service: Service name to restart. dry_run: If True, preview without restarting. target: Firewall target name from config; omit for the default.

[READ] One rule's full detail by uuid/id. Args: uuid: Rule uuid (OPNsense) or id (pfSense), from list_rules. target: Firewall target name from config; omit for the default.

[READ] Flag never-hit enabled rules and shadowed/redundant rules. Finds enabled rules with zero evaluations (dead or misordered), rules fully covered by an earlier terminating rule (shadowed), and rules identical to an earlier one (redundant). Rules are compared in list order, top-down, exactly as pf evaluates them; every finding names the offending/covering rule uuid. Pass 'rules' for pure analysis, or a target to pull live. Args: rules: Injected rows {uuid, sequence, enabled, action, interface, protocol, source, destination, destinationPort, evaluations}. interface: Optiona…

[READ] Active pf state-table entries associated with rules (top-N). Args: top: How many state entries to return (default 50). target: Firewall target name from config; omit for the default.

[READ] Per-rule hit counts / evaluations, busiest first (top-N). Args: top: How many rules to return, busiest first (default 20). target: Firewall target name from config; omit for the default.

[READ] Active pf state-table entries (connections currently tracked). Args: top: How many state entries to return (default 100). target: Firewall target name from config; omit for the default. Returns an envelope: {"states": [...], "returned": N, "limit": L, "truncated": bool, "total": T}. "truncated" is true when the state table holds more entries than were returned.

[WRITE][risk=medium] Enable/disable a filter rule; reversible. Reads the rule first so the harness records an undo that restores its prior enabled state. Staged only — run apply_changes to make it live. Pass dry_run=True to preview. Args: uuid: Rule uuid (OPNsense) or id (pfSense), from list_rules. enable: True to enable the rule, False to disable. dry_run: If True, preview without changing. target: Firewall target name from config; omit for the default.

[READ] Busiest source hosts, aggregated from the state table by bytes. Args: top: How many talkers to return (default 20). target: Firewall target name from config; omit for the default. Returns an envelope: {"topTalkers": [...], "returned": N, "limit": L, "truncated": bool, "total": T}. "truncated" is true when more distinct sources were seen than were returned.

[WRITE][risk=medium] Apply a recorded undo by dispatching its inverse tool. The inverse runs through its own governed tool, so it is audited and labelled with its own risk tier there. Pass dry_run=True to preview the inverse call without executing it. A token can only be applied once. Args: undo_id: The undoId from undo_list (or an ``_undo_id`` in a write result). dry_run: If True, preview the inverse tool + params without running it. target: Passed through to the inverse tool when it accepts a target.

[READ] List recorded, not-yet-applied undo tokens (most recent first). Each entry names the original tool, the inverse tool that ``undo_apply`` would run, and a human note. Use the ``undoId`` with ``undo_apply``. Returns {"undos": [...], "returned": N, "limit": L, "truncated": bool}. ``truncated`` is *measured* (one extra row is fetched), not guessed from a length coincidence: when it is true there are MORE tokens than shown, so re-run with a higher ``limit`` rather than reporting the list as complete. Each entry carries ``effectVerified``. False means the original write lost its response, …

[READ] WireGuard peers with connected state, last handshake, transfer. Args: target: Firewall target name from config; omit for the default.